Electric Power Synchrophasor Network Cyber Security Vulnerabilities by Beasley, Christopher
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Theses Theses
5-2014
Electric Power Synchrophasor Network Cyber
Security Vulnerabilities
Christopher Beasley
Clemson University, beasle6@g.clemson.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized
administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beasley, Christopher, "Electric Power Synchrophasor Network Cyber Security Vulnerabilities" (2014). All Theses. 1993.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/1993
Electric Power Synchrophasor Network Cyber
Security Vulnerabilities
A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
Computer Engineering
by
Christopher T. Beasley
May 2014
Accepted by:
Dr. Richard Brooks, Committee Chair
Dr. G. Kumar Venayagamoorthy, Committe Co-Chair
Dr. Kuang-Ching Wang
Abstract
Smart grid technologies such as synchrophasor devices (Phasor Measurement
Units (PMUs)), make real-time monitoring, control, and analysis of the electric power
grid possible. PMUs measure voltage and current phasors across the electrical power
grid, add a GPS time stamps to measurements, and sends reports to the Phasor Data
Concentrators (PDCs) in the control centers. Reports are used to make decisions
about the condition and state of the power grid. Since this approach relies on Internet
Protocol (IP) network infrastructure, possible cybersecurity vulnerabilities have to be
addressed to ensure that it is stable, secure, and reliable.
In literature, attacks that are relevant to PMUs, are discussed. The system
modeled is the benchmark IEEE 68 bus (New England/New York) power system. This
document details vulnerability testing performed on a network implemented with a
real-time grid simulator, the Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), with SEL PMU
devices monitoring several bases. The first set of security vulnerabilities were found
when running traffic analysis of the network. In using this approach it was found that
the system was susceptible to Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning. This
allowed the switch to be tricked so that all network traffic was rerouted through the
attack computer. This technique allowed for packet analysis, man-in-the-middle, and
denial of service (DOS) attacks.
Side channel analysis was used to distinguish PMU traffic across the virtual
ii
private network (VPN) established by the security gateways. After the traffic was
collected, the inter-packet delays were used to construct a Hidden Markov Model.
This model was used to distinguish measurement packets being transported across
the VPN. Once the measurements are identified, a DOS attack can be performed on
the network.
While this document unveils certain security vulnerabilities within the PMU
network, further testing is needed to provide a full security vulnerability analysis. A
future security agenda is proposed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electricity is essential to maintaining the standard of living in North America
and globally. Citizens need the electrical infrastructure to be reliable. Increasing
consumption requires that either more energy be produced or energy generation be
increasingly efficient. The smart grid is a modern power system that uses informa-
tion and communication technologies to provide efficient, reliable, and sustainable
energy [34]. A smart grid allows for bidirectional flow of information and energy in
the transmission and distribution systems [22]. Real-time monitoring provides sit-
uational awareness, and ensures that power is continuously available to consumers.
Although, real-time feedback is critical to power system operations, communications
are susceptible to cyber-attack.
Previous research has investigated PMU vulnerabilities to Denial of Service
(DOS), malicious code injection, packet analysis, physical damage, Man-in-the-Middle,
and data spoofing attacks. Each attack affects the network in different ways. Each
attack can be put into attack classes: interruption, interception, modification, and
fabrication [31]. Each attack class effects the network in a different manner.
Although, there are some documented attacks, little research has been done
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on addressing known network vulnerabilities with regard to PMU networks. Further
research will need to be applied, to evaluate their affects.
This thesis discusses previously documented attacks as well as the evaluation
of the security vulnerabilities found. The goal is to provide details of possible at-
tacks so that possible countermeasures can be found. Documented attacks give a
background knowledge of current vulnerabilities. The security vulnerability testing
based on traffic analysis and side-channel attacks is documented. Before presenting
the methods, background on the previously researched attacks is given in Chapter 2.
The remainder of this Chapter details the organization of this thesis.
1.1 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 presents background information. PMU networks, the security gate-
way, Documented Attacks on PMU networks, DOS countermeasures, malicious
code injection countermeasures, and data spoofing countermeasures are pre-
sented.
• Chapter 3 describes ARP poisoning to perform a Man-in-the-Middle and DOS
attack. Packet analysis performed on the network is also discussed with recom-
mendations on how to make the network less vulnerable.
• In Chapter 4, introduces the side channel analysis performed. Hidden Markov
Models were used to recognize traffic across the VPN.
• The thesis concludes in Chapter 5. A summary of the thesis and proposed
future work will be introduced.
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1.2 Contributions
This thesis contributes to the area of PMU network security. Specifically, it
introduces documented attacks found through literature review, exposes vulnerabili-
ties found during traffic analysis and side channel analysis, and provides a direction
for future vulnerability testing. The primary objective of this thesis is to address
security vulnerabilities so that possible countermeasures can be found.
Part of this thesis work has been published in the 2014 Clemson University
Power Systems Conference ”Cyber Security Evaluation of Synchrophasors in a Power
System”.
3
Chapter 2
Background
This Chapter provides background on the PMU network and researched at-
tacks. We begin by presenting PMU network basics, the protocol used, and the GPS
synchronized time stamp. Then details of the security gateway and VPN are pro-
vided. Following the discussion of the security gateway, the documented attacks and
counter measures are discussed. A brief summary concludes this chapter.
2.1 PMU Network
Phasor measurement units measure bus voltages, line currents, and frequency
of real-time power systems. Each measurement is tagged with a global positioning
system (GPS) time stamp [23]. PMU readings with time stamps let the system
operators diagnose problems and evaluate changing power conditions. Data is usually
reported to the Phasor Data Collector (PDC) via TCP/IP and stored for analysis [35].
Global Positioning System (GPS) time stamps allow measurements to be synchronized
so the network can be analyzed as a whole [4].
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Figure 2.1: Typical PMU Network Architecture
Figure 2.1 shows the structure of a typical PMU network. Once synchropha-
sors synchronize with the GPS, each measurement they send across the network in-
cludes a time stamp. Electrical distribution line measurements are sent by PMUs
over a network connection to a PDC. The PDC is a regional command station for the
grid [18]. The PDC stores measurements for additional processing.
2.1.1 PMU Protocol
Since PMUs are widely distributed and used by many electric power utilities,
a standard protocol ensures consistent data storage and network communications
between PMU networks. The current PMU communications standard is the IEEE
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C37.118 protocol, which defines synchrophasor data conventions, measurement accu-
racies, and communications formats [20]. To adhere to the IEEE C37.118 protocol,
the synchrophasor has to recognize five frame types [20]:
• Data frame (binary),
• Two configuration frames (binary),
• Header frame (ASCII),
• And command frame (binary).
The configuration and header frames describe the synchrophasor configuration,
the data frame contains measurements, and the command frame tells the PMU when
to start and stop taking measurements [20]. Once measurements have been collected,
they are processed using a phasor data concentrator (PDC) such as the open-source
OpenPDC [1]. OpenPDC takes measurements and sorts them by their time stamps.
The measurements are archived in a database using their time stamps.
2.2 Security Gateway
PMUs and PDCs need to be shielded from the larger network. The security
gateway provides a interface between the critical network components and the inter-
net. Security gateways provide the network with a firewall [32]. In [3] the authors
suggest firewalls should have three main properties: all traffic must enter, only trusted
traffic may pass, and the firewall is immune to penetration. All traffic from the PMU
to the PDC, or from PDC to PMU, needs to pass through the security gateway to
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improve security. It generally uses a deny by default approach (also known as white-
list) to filter traffic. If the component trying to connect to the PMU or PDC is not
on the trusted list for the security gateway, then it is not allowed to pass. So, if the
security gateway is configured and setup correctly, only traffic from the trusted list
may pass. Although, this provides some security, data spoofing still remains a threat
to the system.
Figure 2.2: Security Gateway as a Firewall
Figure 2.2 shows the PMU and PDC being shielded from the wider network
by the security gateway. It can be a local area network behind the security gateway.
Figure 2.3: Security Gateway VPN
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The other job of the security gateway within the network is to establish a VPN
[32]. Establishing a VPN between substations allows measurement and configuration
data to be sent securely between substations. The security gateway uses the IPsec
protocol to establish VPN connections. IPsec uses Encapsulated Security Payload
(ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) protocols to secure data [25]. Once the
payload is encrypted, it is sent across the network. When it reaches the designated
security gateway, the gateway will check to see if the packets were delayed or replayed
and decipher the packet [25]. The measurements are then recorded in the PDCs’
database.
2.3 Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DOS) attackers attempt to consume systems resources, such
as bandwidth, to prevent users from accessing the system. One common type of DOS
attack is an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Smurf attack. The attacker
sends an ICMP echo packet with the victims IP address, all the hosts accept the
ICMP echo packet and reply to the victim computer [37].
In a Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack, the attacker takes control of
multiple machines called bots. Bots can be used to perform malicious activities such as
DDOS attacks. While DOS attacks on traditional IP networks are well studied, DOS
attacks could also be performed on PMU networks. Researchers [21], tested DOS
attacks such as network layer attacks, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
attacks, transport layer attacks, Local Area Network Denial (LAND) attacks, and
teardrop attacks on a PMU network. These attacks take advantage of weaknesses
in network protocols. PMU networks dependence on real-time measurement data,
makes them vulnerable to this attack. If a malicious person were to attack multiple
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PMUs, all measurements from those PMUs would be dropped or delayed. This could
cause inaccurate predictions about the status of the transmission system, delayed
mitigation of power system problems, or total failure of measurement devices along
the network.
2.4 Denial of Service Countermeasures
Though DOS attacks remain a serious threat to power grids that include
PMUs, there are ways to prevent or mitigate the damage caused by an attacker.
One possible solution to DOS attacks on PMU networks would be to use an ”air
gap”. An air gap physically isolates the network. Air gapped networks have no
physical connection to the larger internet. This isolation is costly.
Some common DOS countermeasures are large bandwidth connections to in-
sure the network can handle the traffic. DOS traffic can also be mitigated using
distributed or redundant infrastructure. Researchers [17] discuss existing DDOS
countermeasures. Countermeasures include filtering routers, disabling IP broadcasts,
applying security patches, disabling unused ports, and performing intrusion detec-
tion [17].
2.5 Physical Attacks
A PMU can be isolated from the network using physical attacks that damage
hardware or infrastructure. This includes cutting a network connection between the
PMU and PDC or sabotaging the PMU. Limiting access to critical infrastructure can
mitigate this type of attack.
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2.6 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
Man-in-the-Middle attacks are an (active) interception attack. Man-in-the-
Middle attacks occur when an attacker poses as the other side of a legitimate protocol
session to both the legitimate client and server. For example, if B and A communicate,
the intruder I replaces the BA link with two links BI and IA. An example of this is
shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Example of a Man-in-the-Middle Attack
In a PMU network the Man-in-the-Middle attack occurs between the PMU
and the PDC. The attacker disguises themselves as the PDC to the PMU and as
the PMU to the PDC. Man-in-the-Middle attacks can use route table poisoning and
compromised certificates. Researchers [6] discuss using false certificates to conduct a
Man-in-the-Middle attack. The paper discusses the false certificate vulnerability for
a HTTPS connection. But, this method could be used in any system that uses cer-
tificates to secure connections. If the PDC uses X.509 certificates for authentication
then a man-in-the-middle attack between the PDC and the PMU would be possible.
To prevent this type of attack clients need to authenticate the server they connect
to [24].
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2.7 Packet Analysis
Contents of the PMU TCP/IP packets are susceptible to packet analysis (sniff-
ing). Programs such as Wireshark [11] allow attackers to look at traffic sent across
the network. If encryption is not used, all information communicated can be seen by
the attacker. In [32] researchers used Wireshark [11] to analyze the synchrophasor
network. They found the packets were in clear text. This makes it possible for an
attacker to get passwords and other information sent across the network.
To further evaluate the network, researchers [32] added a security gateway to
the network. The packets are then sent through a virtual private network (VPN)
tunnel. Since all of the packets are sent over a VPN, the traffic is encrypted. VPNs
create a virtual network that connects two trusted sub-networks. The packets sent
within the VPN are in a secure tunnel between clients. To secure communications,
VPN tunnels commonly use the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security
(TLS) or Secure Shell (SSH) protocols. To insure a secure connection the parties on
the network use X.509 certificates to authenticate users and then exchange symmetric
keys. This process is supposed to provide the system with security, but may have
implementation and design errors. Known attacks on SSL/TLS include [5]:
• DNS Cache Poisoning is where the attackers sends spoofed responses to the DNS
server, instead of the user. This causes the DNS to retain faulty information
and return wrong IP addresses when queried.
• ARP Poisoning is when the attacker broadcasts an ARP packet containing the
desired IP and their MAC address. Computers then cache that IP for the
attackers MAC address. All information sent to the desired IP will be routed
through the attackers computer.
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• Man-in-the-Middle Attacks occur when attackers make independent connections
with victims and relays messages between them.
• TLS/SSL Certificate Attacks occur when attackers authenticate themselves on
the network using compromised or faulty certificates.
VPNs are essential for securing traffic, but need to be carefully implemented and their
security verified. These attacks have been shown to work on networks, research still
needs to be conducted to see their impacts on PMU networks.
2.8 Malicious Code Injection
An example of a modification attack is malicious code injection. In malicious
code injection, the attacker inserts new instructions into code to alter its execution.
One common modification attack is Structured Query Language (SQL) injection.
SQL is a standardized language for managing databases. Commonly SQL injection
attacks occur when queries are generated using user input [5].
In PMU networks, the measurements are continuously sent across the network
so that the power system can be measured in real-time. Since the data sent to the
PDC is stored in a database, PMUs are particularly susceptible to SQL injection
attacks [7]. Before measurements are sent, the PMU sends a configuration message
to the PDC to specify the data table structure to be defined in the database [32].
The PDC does not authenticate the configuration message. Instead, it creates the
new tables specified in the configuration message. This leaves the system vulnerable
to code injection.
The SQL injection vulnerability most frequently comes when queries are for-
mulated occur if user input is not properly validated before inclusion in an SQL
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query [9]. The attacker can make the transmission system state appear to be the
opposite of reality. For example, if there is an issue with a transmission bus or line,
an attacker can modify measurements to indicate it is normal, which could put the
power system at risk of an outage.
Researchers in [36], describe two insertion attacks: code-injection and return-
oriented programming. In code-injection, the attacker directly inserts shell code (a
set of malicious instructions) into the program. Return-oriented programming reuses
binary code already present in the system as shell code. Shell code is the software
exploit payload. Either attack can send malicious instructions to the database man-
agement system, to add, delete, or modify the database, or take control of the system.
2.9 Malicious Code Injection Countermeasures
Authors [10] show the security gateway using encryption and decryption to
send packets across the internet. One security gateway encrypts measurement packets
from the PMU. The other security gateway decrypts them before sending to the PDC.
Since packets are encrypted before crossing the network, the attacker should be unable
to decipher them. In modern operating systems, code injection is made difficult by
randomizing the system address space, separating code and data, and monitoring the
stack to detect buffer overflows [5]. The PMU and PDC should use operating systems
that have these countermeasures.
To counteract SQL injection attacks: either check inputs for characters that
can be abused, or use parameterized statements that force user inputs to follow a
static template [8]. These templates only allow certain inputs to be translated into
queries. For further prevention, databases should also have strict access controls
for allowing users to modify or manipulate data [5]. In [8] authors also discuss using
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static analysis and run-time monitoring, proxy filters, intrusion detection systems, and
encapsulating database queries to provide safe and effective ways to access databases.
2.10 Data Spoofing
Data spoofing occurs when attackers falsify data. The PMUs continuously
send data to the PDC. Instructions on how to set up database tables are included.
If the PDC does not authenticate PMU connections, the PDC may accept fabricated
data.
PMU data gives operators information so they can be aware of the condition
of the electric grid. Data accuracy is important. Data spoofing gives the program
forged data instead of actual data. This can be detrimental to grid stability and
reliability. In [30] researchers inject false data into the system. This data can either
be PMU measurements or time stamps. In [29] authors spoof GPS measurement time
stamps. Altering measurement times can render measurements useless. For example,
readings can be reordered to make capacity reduction seem to be capacity increase,
etc.
2.11 Data Spoofing Countermeasures
Data spoofing has little effect when it is limited to a single data feed [18]. To
mitigate data spoofing, the grid can use multiple PMUs to monitor the same trans-
mission bus or line, which makes spoofing more complicated. The use of redundant
measuring devices is suggested in [2], where the authors use redundant smart meters.
The same idea is relevant to PMUs.
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2.12 Summary
This Chapter detailed PMU networks. This includes PMU protocols, and the
security gateway. Vulnerabilities common to PMU networks were discussed. The
common vulnerabilities were DOS, physical attacks, man-in-the-middle, packet anal-
ysis, malicious code injection, and data spoofing.
15
Chapter 3
Traffic Analysis
PMUs and PDCs communicate over the network. To perform traffic analy-
sis, attackers just need access to the connection. In this Chapter we present PMU
traffic analysis tests. We begin by describing the laboratory setup. Then we show
the network is vulnerable to DOS, man-in-the-middle, and packet analysis attacks.
Finally, we summarize our results and give recommendations for fixing discovered
vulnerabilities.
3.1 Experimental Setup
The laboratory used in this research contained a benchmark IEEE 68 bus
(New England/New York) power system simulated using the Real-Time Digital Sim-
ulator (RTDS) [16]. The RTDS can simulate scenarios such as substation failures or
disturbances that reflect conditions based on real world scenarios. All measurements
produced by RTDS are collected by the PMU, and given time stamps [23].
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Figure 3.1: Laboratory Setup
Figure 3.1 shows the current laboratory setup. Each measurement is encapsu-
lated in a data frame and sent through the network. The header includes the packet
destination and source address. The switch reads the header and delivers the mea-
surements to the PDC. The PDC could be located at a regional control center in
the actual electric grid [18]. A super PDC could be located at independent system
operators monitoring control center. The super PDC would collect data from all re-
gional control centers. All measurements are stored in a database, such as a MySQL
database, for further processing. The PDC runs open source openPDC software [1].
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Figure 3.2: OpenPDC Interface
An example openPDC interface is in Figure 3.2. The openPDC software
allows the controller to view all the packet information being sent from the PMUs.
This would include data such as phasor measurements, PMU ID, and information
whether the PMU is currently online.
3.2 Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Poisoning
To analyze packets an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning
attack was used. Using Kali Linux [12], ARP packets associating the victim’s IP and
the Kali Linux computer’s MAC address were broadcast. Local network machines
then cache this information. This ensured that PMU network traffic would be routed
through the attack computer. The attack computer can then forward them to the
PDC. This enables packet analysis and man-in-the-middle attacks. All data sent from
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the PMU to the PDC can easily be viewed and modified.
Figure 3.3: Wireshark Screen Capture
Figure 3.3 shows a Wireshark [11] capture of the network traffic. It shows
data packets being sent from one PMU to the PDC. The figure shows the source IP
address, the destination IP address, protocol, and data. Since the packets are sent
across the network without the security gateway, all information is in clear text. This
lets us view information such as passwords, measurement data, and configuration
information.
Since the packets are routed through our computer we can perform a replay
attack. By recording data and resubmitting it later. Man-in-the-middle attacks
modify the measurements.
Rerouting traffic through an attack computer can also enable DOS attacks.
If the PMU discards packets on the way to the PDC, it appears as if the PMU is offline.
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Figure 3.4: Denial of Service Attack
Figure 3.4 shows a DOS attack convincing the PDC that the PMUs are offline.
Using this technique, it is possible to take PMUs offline using a simple script.
The PMUs have to be configured. To configure the PMU, the system admin-
istrator must enter passwords. After three incorrect password entry’s, the system
administrator is locked out for sixty seconds. An attacker can perform a DOS attack
by repeatedly entering incorrect passwords to lock operators out of the system.
When configuring the PMUs, one available option is the Telnet network ser-
vice. Telnet is a terminal based text-oriented communication protocol. Telnet sends
messages in clear text. Each password allows different access to the PMU. For ex-
ample, access level 1 allows viewing but not changing settings. Access level 2, gives
full access over the system. Telnet allows the entire configuration session to be seen,
including the passwords.
Figure 3.5 shows a Wireshark [11] capture screen shot of a PMU configuration
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Figure 3.5: Prompting for Password over Telnet
over Telnet where the system is prompting the user for a password. Figures 3.6 -
3.9, show the packets containing the password information.
Figure 3.6: First Letter of the Password
Figure 3.7: Second Letter of the Password
Figure 3.8: Third Letter of the Password
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Figure 3.9: Final Letter of the Password
The data shows that the password is TAIL. This is the level 2 access password
for the PMUs. Once I have level 2 access, I have full control over the PMU. This is
problematic for the power industry. It is our recommendation when configuring the
PMUs that the operators not be able to use Telnet.
3.3 Summary
This Chapter describes traffic analysis of a PMU network. Using an ARP
poisoning attack, we found that several security vulnerabilities exist. These include
packet analysis, DOS, and man-in-the-middle. These attacks were carried out on a
local area network but, the same attack can be carried out over a wide area network,
such as the Internet. Researchers [13] have found that due to a flaw in the design of
the Border Gate Protocol (BGP), attackers can route packets through any path they
choose. While building a separate network infrastructure is costly, it removes this
vulnerability.
While the system allows the user to change the default access level passwords,
it is not required. It is recommended that the system administrator be forced to
change the default passwords. This would help prevent attackers from gaining access.
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Chapter 4
Side Channel Analysis
In Chapter 3, we discussed the vulnerabilities associated with PMUs sending
measurements through the network in clear text. To send encrypted data, PMU
networks can use security gateways. While encrypting data via a VPN hardens se-
curity, further investigation of remaining vulnerabilities needs to be conducted. In
this Chapter, we detail a side channel analysis of VPN traffic through the security
gateways. The results of this attack are then summarized.
4.1 Detection of PMUs across the VPN
Side channel attacks take advantage of information leaked by the physical im-
plementation of the cryptosystem. We use timing patterns. Although, information is
encrypted, the timing pattern remains. Removing timing patterns requires significant
performance impact.
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4.1.1 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) model stochastic processes that are difficult to
observe. Unlike the standard HMM [26] that uses two sets of random processes: states
and outputs, our model uses a single set of random processes: the state transitions.
This model is equivalent to classical models [26].
Figure 4.1: HMM with States and Transitions
Figure 4.1 shows an example HMM with two states and 6 transitions. Each
state has outgoing transitions. Each transition has a transition probability. The sum
of the outgoing transition probabilities for any state has to equal 1.
Traditionally the Baum-Welch algorithm is used to infer the state transition
matrix and symbol output possibilities [26]. In [28] HMMS are inferred using the
Causal State Splitting and Reconstruction (CSSR) algorithm. The CSSR algorithm
is dependent on input data in the form of sequences of characters with length L. The
history sequence L has to be sufficient in length to indicate the state. All sequences
with length less than or equal to L are merged into alike states.
In [27] the HMM is derived without a priori information. Our approach follows
the HMM inference in [19]. The HMM is inferred using an initial L. Then the training
data is traced through the model. The L is increased until the structure of the HMM
remains constant. When the structure stabilizes, no additional information can be
gained from increasing L [27].
24
4.1.2 Hidden Markov Model Generation
HMMs can be generated directly from timing data [5]. This application uses
inter-packet delays of data sent between security gateways. The inter-packet delays
provide information of the underlying processes [33]. To find the inter-packet delays,
we observe the packets using Wireshark [11]. Wireshark directly displays inter-packet
delays. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the HMM is a stochastic process. The inter-packet
delays need to be converted from analog to digital symbolized data, to generate the
HMM. To convert the inter-packet delays into symbols, we make a histogram.
Figure 4.2: Histogram of inter-Packet Delays
Figure 4.2 shows a histogram of the the number of packets versus the inter-
packet delays (in milliseconds) of one PMU being sent across the VPN by the security
gateways. Each inter-packet delay was multiplied by a scaling factor to make them
easier to read. The histogram contains approximately 10,000 packets. Using this
graph, the packets can be grouped into 3 distinct symbols.
Table 4.1 shows the translation between the symbol and the associated inter-
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Table 4.1: HMM Symbols from inter-packet Delay
Symbol Delay Time (Milliseconds)
A 0-20
B 20-40
C 40-60
packet delay. After symbolizing the inter-packet delay the HMM is built using the
HMM inference algorithm [27] [28]. Figure 4.3 is an HMM of the data.
Figure 4.3: HMM of the inter-packet Delays Inside VPN
4.1.3 Experimental Results
After inferring the model of measurement traffic through the VPN, we detect
whether the model can distinguish measurement traffic from random traffic. There
were 10,000 packets of measurement traffic and 3,000 packets of random traffic. They
were broken down into sequences of 24 symbols each. If the measurement traffic was
identified correctly, it was defined as a true positive. If the random traffic was iden-
tified as a measurement packet, it was defined as a false positive. A ROC detection
curve was then drown using the confidence interval approach. Figure 4.4 shows the
ROC curve.
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Figure 4.4: ROC of Detection
Figure 4.4 shows the true positive versus false positive rate of detecting the
measurement data sent from one PMU through the VPN. The results give a 84’%’
true positive versus 12’%’ false positive rate. Thus, we can positively identify the
measurement traffic sent from one PMU through the VPN.
4.2 Summary
While using security gateways to send measurements packets through VPN’s
can be used to encrypt network traffic, the system still remains vulnerable to side
channel analysis. In this Chapter we discussed using the inter-packet delays between
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packets across the VPN to detect measurement data. Once the inter-packet delays
have been collected using a packet analysis tool, a hidden Markov model can detect
measurement packets. Once, these packets are identified, an attacker can reroute
and drop packets. This attack could be detrimental in monitoring the condition of
the power grid. One possible solution to this problem, would be to build a separate
infrastructure for communicating data.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary
With the addition of PMUs to the existing electrical power grid, information
exchange about the power grid has become possible. This allows for efficient, reliable,
and cost effective power generation. However, the added networking brings further
security concerns. The lab is modeled after the IEEE 68 bus (New England/New
York) power system. It has been shown that packet analysis, man-in-the-middle, and
DOS attacks are possible using ARP poisoning. Additionally, it has be shown that
packets sent across the VPN are susceptible to side channel analysis.
In Chapter 1, gives an introduction on why security research on PMUs is
important. Due to the limited amount of research on PMU networks, further research
needs to be conducted to provide overall security. This was the motivation behind
the work.
Chapter 2, provides the background behind the PMU network, protocols used,
the security gateway, researched attacks and countermeasures. This Chapter provides
a basis of knowledge of the general overview of a PMU network and its functionality.
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In Chapters 3 and 4 security vulnerabilities for the PMU network are discussed.
In Chapter 3 ARP poisoning was used to reroute traffic through a attack computer.
This exposed DOS, man-in-the-middle, and packet analysis security vulnerabilities.
Chapter 3 also provided security recommendations. Chapter 4 details using side
channel analysis to determine measurement data across a VPN. Using HMMs the
traffic could be identified. As discussed, this leaves the system susceptible to DOS
attacks.
In this paper documented attacks and traffic and side channel analysis are dis-
cussed. The hope is by addressing security vulnerabilities to industry and academia,
vulnerabilities can be corrected. Although, this thesis has addressed some security
concerns, further research is needed expose potential security vulnerabilities. A future
security verification agenda is proposed.
5.2 Security Recommendations
In Chapter 3, we discussed vulnerabilities such as DOS due to incorrect pass-
words, default passwords being used to access the PMU and configuration data and
passwords being sent in clear text. Using a security gateway to send traffic through
a VPN would encrypt data.
When configuring the PMU, the system shouldn’t allow the Telnet protocol.
This would prevent passwords from being sent in clear text. The PMU should also
require the system administrators to change the default passwords. This would help
prevent attackers from gaining access to the passwords.
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5.3 Future Work
Although, some vulnerabilities have been exposed, further testing could iden-
tify others. We propose a security verification agenda. This section details the future
agenda. The security agenda is broken down into 6 parts: penetration testing, pro-
tocol inference and analysis, security performance verification, further side channel
analysis, game theory analysis, and hardening. When performing these tests, the
NERC : (CIP) Critical Infrastructure Protection needs to addressed.
5.3.1 Penetration Testing
For penetration testing, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE),
fuzzing, buffer overflow and SSL/TLS vulnerabilities need to be tested. The CVE
database discloses known security flaws. This database may hold vulnerabilities re-
lated to PMUs. The network needs fuzzing tests. Fuzzing attacks consist of inserting
random data into the inputs of a program to expose security vulnerabilities. Since the
security gateway uses X.509 certificates, protocol vulnerabilities need to be checked.
5.3.2 Protocol Inference and Analysis
Since the protocol can easily be viewed if messages are in clear text, protocol
inference is simple. But, when VPNs are used, side channel analysis can be used. If
traffic is in clear text or protocol vulnerabilities can be used to authenticate on the
network, than data leakage becomes problematic. Leaked data could be passwords or
measurements. If the attacker is able to obtain the password, than the PMU can be
taken over.
As shown in this thesis, DOS attacks are an issue. Different protocols can
be vulnerable to DOS attacks. DOS attacks need to be addressed so they can be
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fixed. DDOS attacks can be carried out against the network. DDOS testing can be
performed using tools such as Stacheldraht [15] and Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC)
[14]. Each of these tools are free and easily accessible.
5.3.3 Security Performance Verification
While the security of the PMU network is crucial, the power grid also has
to provide reliable, efficient, and consistent electricity to millions of people. The
performance of the network needs to be evaluated along with the security protocol.
To test the performance versus security logical verification, petri-net analysis, and
performance sensitivity need to be analyzed.
5.3.4 Side Channel Analysis
This paper detailed side channel analysis in Chapter 4. Further side channel
analysis can be used to determine other characteristics about the network. Different
parts of the physical implementation of the cryptosystem can be analyzed to find
vulnerabilities.
5.3.5 Game Theory
The PMU network can be put into a game theory model. Game theory is the
study of strategic decision making. Putting the network into a game theory model
would allow for evaluation of security flaws. Depending on the results, decision and
control framework could be established.
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5.3.6 Hardening
Hardening, when referring to network security, refers to reducing system vul-
nerability. The security gateway is one device that can be used to harden the network.
Along with establishing a VPN, the security gateway is supposed to close unused net-
work ports. To validate this claim, a simple port scanning technique can be tested.
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